

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Following based on uncleared Memorandum of conversation with between Secretary and Stikker, at which Kohler, Hitze and Darbrow/[in margin above sentence](USRO DCK) also present. Secretary and Stikker spent hour discussing major NATO problems particularly with respect to berlin. Summary follows:

1. Long-Term NATO Planning. Stikker urged early programs on long-term NATO planning saying NAC meeting scheduled September 18th. Failure make progress at that meeting means, in Stikker view, that effort should be abandoned for this year. This unfortunate in view Oslo resolution calling for action by December 1961 NATO Ministerial meeting. Also unfortunate in that meaningful NATO Annual Review would, in effect, have to be postponed for yet another year.

Kohler replied U.S. working on formula for proceeding with action on requirement minus MRBM'S, which would permit proceeding

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Following based on Unclassified Memorandum of Conversation with between  
(MEMO DCM)  
Secretary and Stikker, at which Kohler, Hitz and Darbrow/also present.

Secretary and Stikker spent hour discussing major NATO problems particularly  
with respect to Berlin. Summary follows:

1. Long-Term NATO Planning. Stikker urged early progress on long-term  
NATO planning (saying NSC meeting scheduled September 10th). Failure make  
progress at that meeting means, in Stikker's view, that effort should be  
abandoned for this year. This unfortunate in view Oslo resolution calling  
for action by December 1961 NATO Ministerial meeting. Also unfortunate in  
that year-end NATO Annual Review would, in effect, have to be postponed  
for yet another year.

Kohler replied U.S. working on formula which would permit/ proceeding  
with action on requirements, minus MRMs, which would permit proceeding

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS  
Agency Case # 106-8902729  
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By 766 NLE Date 11/21/00

## PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

with longer-range military program.

2. NATO Military Buildup for Berlin. Stikker expressed general satisfaction with regulation to date of action by NATO countries to take immediate steps to reinforce their military posture in light of Berlin situation as recommended by General Norstad [words excised] Canadian and Italian appear to be doing well. [words excised] Stikker added that many countries able step up military effort with own resources. Others, however, will need U.S. military aid to supplement their own efforts. Cited Greece and Turkey as obvious cases and said that Norway, Denmark and Italy also need some measure U.S. military aid to supplement increased efforts of their own.

Nitze replied that we felt Italy in excellent financial shape and questioned whether military aid required. Agreed some aid for Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey necessary. Stikker reaffirmed view that Italy will require some military hardware from U.S. to supplement its own efforts.

Secretary stressed importance well-rounded increased military efforts, with buildup in all aspects; for example calling up of increased numbers of men without parallel steps to increase stocks does not give convincing demonstration of real seriousness of purpose. Stikker stressed importance of making full use NAC for any effort bring about well-rounded buildup programs.

3. Economic Counter Measures. Stikker said that NAC consideration economic counter measures had not gone as well as had military buildup discussions. Stikker said situation made difficult for him

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[same page]

because Four Powers had first on their own developed clear-cut proposal and had then submitted it to council in preemptory fashion. Stikker urged that in future subject be handled in manner that will not give impression that Four are dictating terms to other NATO countries on QUOTE take it or leave it UNQUOTE basis.

Secretary said he felt that problem in this field is one of basic attitude towards Berlin situation. Question is one of degree of seriousness with which countries take Berlin situation. If there is conviction that defense of our vital interests in Berlin may mean war and if this is accepted in all of its implications, it becomes clear that we must be prepared to go all the way to impose economic sanctions as a step just prior to war itself.

Stikker agreed that Governments of many NATO countries do not realize all ramifications and implications of Berlin situation and do not take situation with full seriousness which it deserves. Therefore, most important that NATO be brought most fully into all aspects Berlin problem. Stikker said and helpful but difficulty is that NAC must be told over and over and be brought intimately into aspects, planning, political, military and economic [11 lines excised]

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Stikker agreed that Governments of many NATO countries do not realize all ramifications and implications of Berlin situation and do not take situation with full seriousness which it deserves. Therefore, most important that NATO be brought most fully into all aspects Berlin problem. Stikker said that Secretary's statement to August 8th NSC meeting had been most useful and helpful but difficulty is that NSC must be told over and over and be brought intimately into all aspects, ~~political~~ political, military and economic.

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